It is often alleged that hypothetical social contract theories are waste of paper because they are hypothetical. That remark seems logical. After all, what’s the practical value of those vague theories relying heavily on suspicious assumptions, analogies and metaphors?

But if they are useless, why would they be banned by contemporary crown-heads? Why should those powerful men feel threatened by “wasted paper”? I would argue the opposite: despite their theoretical nature, social contract theories are very useful.

Actually, all hypothetical contract theories can be useful. They sure look innocent when resting on book shelves, but once they are released into minds, they can be seriously destructive. By providing justification – merely justification and nothing else – those contract theories changed the history. They challenged suppressive ideology, shook the legitimacy of thrones, unleashed power of the people and led to revolutions for freedom.

Social theories can dictate the “right order” for societies. Before enlightenment, people had been bound by kings’ favorite theory of contract – the divine right of kings. This concept is essentially another form of social contract, in which the Party A (god) authorizes Party B (the king) to rule the subject (people) and to take them as property. This contract is very convenient for the king, because it allowed him to bypass the angry people and go straightly to god; when he comes back from the heaven, he already had god’s appointment certificate in his hands. You may see how clever it is to invoke god – the most unquestionable source of authority. Looking in retrospect, we can hardly find any proof for the hypothetical concept of divine rights, but we have to agree that it was useful and handy for rulers. By virtue of repetition and brainwashing propagation, monarchs planted their fictional theory deeply into people’s minds, made them voluntary slaves, outlawed dissents, justified his own rule, and sustained hereditary monarchy for hundreds of years.

An even more successful contract theory was devised in China – I call it more successful because of its longevity of three thousand years. It was almost the same “divine approval” theory with another name. Created in Zhou Dynasty in 1122 BC [1], it was called “the mandate of heaven”, and its main difference from its European counterpart was created by usurpers who sought justification for their action. The theory stated that heaven would bless the authority of a just ruler, but would be displeased with a despotic ruler and would withdraw its mandate. A successful revolt could be interpreted as evidence that the Mandate of Heaven had passed, and it would transfer to those who would rule better. [2] This “bill of usurper rights” was first used by the Zhou Dynasty to justify their overthrow of the Shang Dynasty. And unsurprisingly, it was later used by many succeeding dynasties to come.

Other such theories throughout the world reigned as well. They were the predecessors of the enlightenment social contract theories, and were exactly what the later theories challenged and defeated. But they did rule the world for quite a long time. Their explanations of social order were inadequate, their expressions vague, their logics awkward; they relied solely on mysterious speculations. But they conquered minds and made people obedient for ages. Are those theories hypothetical? Yes. Are they hypocritical? Probably. Are they useful? Certainly.

Many attempts against despots have been made, but most of them were unsatisfactory. We can imagine the bad time those early revolutionists had. Let’s consider what barrier our revolutionist had to overcome before actually doing something: firstly, he must explain to himself why he could revolt without a sense of guilt when that is considered totally illegitimate; secondly how could he persuade followers to revolt without feeling guilty; thirdly he had to declare to the public of all the unjustified ideas that monarchs are not holy, obedience is not duty, and rebellions are not evil. In a word, he needed justification. He was not only fighting against a monarch, but also a set of firmly held beliefs of the society. Those fictional doctrines used by monarch prolonged monarchy by dictating what people think, and the longevity of monarchy perpetuates those doctrines, making social change even more difficult. Thus there were so many rebellions against monarchs but seldom against the monarchial system, and subversion of a despot usually ends up with another. And let’s not blame our revolutionist: how could he make real improvement before knowing what a free state would look like?

Are people free from their birth? How can they overthrow their ruler, and what could they do after the overthrown? All these questions needed answers, and actions needed justification. The new contract theories provided the answers and justifications. The parties involved in this new contract are only the government and the people, and it decrees that the right of the former derives solely from the consent of the latter. When people come together they form a “sovereign”, and it produces a “general will” as their collective will; the agreement of the contract is still binding, though theoretically dissents may leave. God is invoked less often, but just like those they are situated against, the new contracts still appeal to something higher – nature. The attempt to relate humans to nature climaxed with a speculation of “state of nature” and the argument that the “natural” formation of society is driven by “mutual consent”. Thus is the new contract theory. It sounds much more plausible and attractive to people. Straightforwardly, they striped kings of divine power and tied them to the will of people.

The new contract proved a really powerful weapon. Though monarchs banned the books, exiled the authors, they couldn’t stop the spread of ideas. And ideas can be dangerous. When the liberating thoughts proliferated all over countries, the demise of old social order is just a matter of time.

Liberation comes from within. One cannot be free until he wills to be so, and once his got that will he cannot be stopped. Rousseau put it much better: “liberty is not to be found in any form of government; she is in the heart of the free man; he bears her with him everywhere.” [3]

Some people argue that social contract couldn’t be legally binding because no one really signed it. But actually, contracts are binding only because we made them so. Again, social contracts do more than analyze social norms – they create norms. Now that social contracts have taken control of minds, let’s examine the results. Still remember our revolutionist who was frustrated by lack of justification for his rebellion? If he still lives today, citing a hypothetical social contract, he can conclude that he is born to be free. Government heads may well disagree – the point is that if they do, they will have to say why – and if they want to deny him any rights, again they will have to justify that denial. One may well find those theoretical contracts to be nonsense, but he has to prove it to others first – and now the onus is on him the dissenter. See the reversed pattern?

Long before state exists, tribe leaders knew denouncing the wrongdoings of enemies could increase morale. Judges could refer to legal antecedents to justify their decision. Rhetoricians could use metaphors, clericals could invoke scriptures, essayists could quote ancient sentences, and even in the case of a president facing scandal, he still could invoke the Bible to evade questions. Justification gives people strength, while illegitimacy deprives power. For centuries, people were enslaved by theories that worked for dictators. By providing the justification of freedom, the hypothetical social contract theories unleashed the latent power of people, ended frustrations and ignited the remarkable pursuit of freedom.

References

[1] “Mandate of heaven” – Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_of_heaven

[2] “Mandate of heaven” – Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_of_heaven

[3] Jean- Jacques Rousseau, Emile, Book V [1719]

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