Jiacui Li

Dr. Hélène Landemore

POLS0820D: Freedom

15 December 2008

Do more choices mean more freedom? Usually, the answer is yes. When eating at a restaurant, we hope for more alternatives on the menu. When registering courses for next semester, we hope for more choices offered, so there can be a better chance of finding the right fits for us. However, I will argue that simply having more alternatives in decision making does not necessarily mean more freedom.

There are two leading explanations, each approaching from a different perspective. The first theory, which is frequently adopted by libertarian paternalists, centers on people’s inherent irrationality. The second, less well know theory shifts the focus from the chooser to the choices, and argues that the sheer bulk of alternatives creates a “burden of choices”. In this paper, I will briefly summarize the first theory, introduce the second, and offer a third, tentative theory that speculates about the nature of choices. This third theory argues that some choices are inherently bad and encroach on our freedom as long as they exist. These three arguments are thus sequenced because each one is, in some sense, stronger than the previous one: the second holds true when assuming the first one does not exist, and the third theory works even when the first two are not considered.

People have been praising reason and denouncing irrationality for centuries. This sentiment is strongly captured in this line from British sociologist Barbara Wootton: “The sordid and savage story of history has been written by man’s irrationality, and the thin precarious crust of civilization which has from time to time been built over the bloody mess has always been built by reason.” The confidence in human reason, in a large part, leads to the conclusion that more choices means more freedom, because we assume that people has the ability to make reasonable choices. However, there are objections.

First argument – “Irrationality”

In the first argument, psychologists, sociologists, economists and cognitive scientists tell us that people are irrational. Quite different from the theorists before who wrote long essays arguing about the logic, they relied on statistics and controlled experiments to show their point. Their conclusion, that people are irrational, is not very counterintuitive, but it is still disturbing to see our thinking patterns analyzed and put forth on paper. Their work implies that people get lost with too many liberties, and they need guidance to correct their irrationality. Thus, since people do not always choose the right choice before them, it follows that simply stacking more alternatives in front of them does not necessarily enhance their freedom.

Second argument – “a burden of choices”

The second argument of “a burden of choices” is essentially the argument in my pervious paper ^[1] applied on an individual scale. Instead of considering the expediency of decision making in society, this time the focus is on the decision-making of individuals. More choices require more time and effort in deliberation, and when there are too many choices, this cost may well exceed the benefit of reaching a sound judgment. Consider dining in a restaurant with a menu thicker than dictionary. Will you read through the whole list? Definitely not. Why? Because when there are too many options, it becomes a burden, and the cost of reading more far exceeds the benefit, which is a well ordered dinner. By the time you finish reading the menu, it is already time to order for the next day’s dinner.

This concept of “burden of choice” is broadly explored by American psychologist Barry Schwartz. He approached the question from a psychological perspective, and explained why too many choices usually become a source of unhappiness. This is also not very counterintuitive in our age when consumers get lost in an ever-growing abundance and variety of goods in stores, and web browsers get lost in the bloom of information online. Likewise, while students enjoy the “core-less” open curriculum in Brown University, they also experience frustration from picking four courses out of two thousand alternatives every semester. More is not always better, because we are not ready to handle too many of them. In his book The Paradox of Choice: why more is less (2004) ^[2], Barry Schwartz says it well:

Freedom of choice is essential to self-respect, public participation, mobility, and nourishment, but not all choice enhances freedom. Increased choice among goods and services may contribute little or nothing to the kind of freedom that counts. Indeed, it may impair freedom by taking time and energy we*d be better off devoting to other matters.

This argument is stronger than the first one in the sense that, even if we assume that people are perfectly rational (therefore discarding the irrationality theory), the second argument still holds true. No matter how rational you are when it comes to decision making, an excess of choices is always a burden.

The third argument – “options and traps”

This argument rests in distinguishing two types of choices and categorizing them into “options” and “traps”. By “options”, I refer to the beneficial choices that expand the degree of freedom people have in decision making; by “traps”, I refer to the alternatives whose presence endangers the free choice of people. I would argue that choices that fall into the first category increase freedom for the decision maker, while those in the second category work in the opposite direction.

Choices enhance our freedom as long as we are their masters. A master tries, compares, chooses and sometime discards different options for his own benefit, and does all these with ease. But this only holds true as long as the choice is a true “option” that is innocent and does not tamper with our ability to choose freely. “Traps” are different. Fundamentally, for a choice to be an option, it has to be an elective that we can freely 1) experiment with, 2) choose and 3) get rid of. Again, consider the scene in a restaurant. The newly added entries on the menu enlarges your freedom of choice because you can taste it to see if it fits your appetite; afterwards, if you like it, you can decide to order; and you can order some other dish next time. With the freedom to experiment, freedom to choose and the freedom to discard, this new entry clearly serves as an “option”, and enhances your freedom as a diner.

At the same time, there are addictive choices that fall into the category of “traps” whose mere existence threatens our position as their masters or even turn us into slaves. We cannot experiment on them without a penalty; we choose them compulsively even when our reason tells us otherwise; we cannot quit them without experiencing pain. These “traps” erode our sound judgment by coercing our weaker, pleasure-oriented self into addiction, and force us to choose them despite the sober protest of our stronger, reasonable self. People choose such “traps”, but seldom out of free will, but because of lack of free will. Moreover, once such addictive “traps” enter one’s life, they keep on deepening his dependence until he is enslaved. Such choices definitely do not enlarge our freedom of choice, but eats it away.

Have you ever seen people addicted to hard drugs? They apparently lose their freedom of choice when it comes to those chemicals. It is not that the abuser is not aware of the health hazards, or that he does not want to get rid of it, but that he cannot get rid of it. The addictive drug erodes his mind, enticing and forcing him to indulge in the immediate pleasures in every inhale or injection. It can be said that, although it is the addict who take up the drug every time, he is not really choosing, because he has lost the ability to choose, and it is actually the drug choosing him; he is no longer a master who can choose whether to take the drug, but a slave to it. If we come back to the fundamental definitions of a beneficial “option”, we see that the drug, as a “choice”, violates all three of them. Heroin simply cannot be experimented on without a risk of losing-control; people who choose it seldom do so out of self-will, but are coerced by its effects; it is painful to quit, even with the help of meditation and external forces. Drugs do not tie addicts up with steel chains and locks, but are more restrictive, since chains can only enslave the body, while drugs enslave the mind. It follows naturally that freedom to such mind-enslaving choices are not real freedoms, but potential traps that lie there waiting for innocent prey.

Drugs are extreme examples, and there are also lots of other “traps” that enslave minds with various degree of enslavement. They may not be physically addictive, but they also tamper with the faculty to choose the right choice by habit-forming. The categorization of choices into options and traps is not a clear cut distinction, but rather two ends on a graduated scale. For those choices that fall in between, whether they enhance your freedom or not depend on your strength of will, for people with a stronger self-control are master to such choices, while people who give in to their weakness are not. Every year, there are tens of millions of smokers who want to quit but fail (recall the third definition). It is the same situation with alcoholics. Financially irresponsible get addicted to credit cards that provide a false sense of confidence until they see the accumulated debt on the monthly bill. Students addicted to video games forget about their studies or even their regular life, not because they enjoy their life style, but they feel helpless with the lure on their desks. Impulsive eaters cannot follow the diet they prescribed to themselves. Such choices appeal to the weakness of human mind – shortsightedness, pleasure-seeking, indecision, caprice, obstinacy, procrastination, imprudence and compulsion. Depending on the strength of the individual, this list may go on and on.

A collective anti-liberal endeavor

As you can see, these arguments challenge more than “more choice is more freedom”; they are actually attacking the belief in human reason, which carries much more significance than most have realized. In literature, human reason, as a central topic, has trigger great works for tens of centuries. In economics, the belief in human judgment lays the foundation of free market economy. In politics, voter reason justifies the efficiency of democracy. In political philosophy, the basic liberalism claim that people are best judges for themselves cannot hold without the trust in human rationality.

The ancient philosophers made numerous famous arguments for human reason, but now they are faced with a group of empiricists who prefer statistics to rhetoric. Behavioral economists are attacking the assumption of market efficiency; Bryan Caplan’s “The Myth of the Rational Voter” ^[3] points straightly to democracy; and all those efforts, combined together, attempts to undermine liberalism. This somewhat anti-liberal endeavor has not made a big influence yet, but we should also see it is a trend that just started for a couple of years. The scientists are trying to modify the conclusions made centuries ago, and they need more time for such a daunting task. Let us have some patience, and we shall see where the future leads.

—————-

References

[1] Jiacui Li, “The falling point of Utility”. Available at http://eagerminds.wordpress.com/2008/11/08/the-falling-point-of-utility-a-utilitarian-critique-of-mill/

[2] Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less. Harper Perennial.

[3] Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton University Press.

Qian Yin

Dr. Hélène Landemore

POLS0820D: Freedom

7 November 2008

Thoughts are powerful. Individuals act upon their opinions; countries are designed according to political theories – thoughts shape the world. Theoretically, if we can all be guided by truths and abstain from the damage that a blinded opinion does to both the society and our mental well being, we would all be better off. Consequently some people think that thoughts should be controlled; by prohibiting the false opinions and protecting the true ones, we live a better life. John Stuart Mill does not agree, evidenced by his claim that “suppressing free thought often hurts the suppressors more than the suppressed”. It is not possible to accurately measure whether the suppressor or the suppressed is more severely hurt, but Mill’s argument shows that the negative effect of suppressing free thought is so great to the suppressor that it does the opposite of fulfilling the suppressor’s primary goal – it does not promote the truths, and also impairs the suppressor’s mental well being.

As is presented above, the act of suppressing certain thoughts is based upon the judgment that some beliefs are true and do not need to be contested. Yet according to Mill, this is a judgment never to be made. History has seen too many examples of once widely accepted and firmly insisted beliefs later proved wrong. For example, ancient people understood the earth to be the center of the universe, and the sun as another moon, until the establishment and prevalence of the heliocentric theory. During the thousands of years when China was under a despotic monarchy, every subject accepted that the rule of a monarch was absolute and supreme, until the light of the modern era revealed that a people have the right to rule themselves. An opinion, however firmly believed, is based on what men know about the world at a certain point of time. Yet as the world changes, and people’s knowledge of the world increases, an opinion safely held today can be shaken tomorrow because of a new discovery or a new situation that people find themselves in. So long as we cannot claim that we know every single fact about the world and can correctly predict its move, we are not in the position to assume any belief infallible. Mill claims that, “the beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded” (23). It is only when a belief is examined with all the current knowledge and contested by everything that can be said against it, yet still remain standing, that we can rely on it. Therefore, the suppressors of free thought, holding certain beliefs unchallengeable, are not protecting the truths, but damaging the ground on which they can be regarded as truths. As they silence their opponents, they silence those who are most likely to point out the possible mistakes of the theory, or the possible improvements that can be made. If their belief is false, no one is allowed to tell them so. What can be more dangerous than putting oneself under the guide of a false judgment? The suppressors of free thought take a high risk of doing that.

But apart from the harm that the suppressors may do to themselves when they are directed by a false belief, suppressing free thought harms them even if the belief they hold is “true”. One thing to be noticed here is that, simply claiming to hold a belief does not necessarily mean understanding it. For instance, people may claim that the international community should intervene in genocides happening in other countries; however, what they mean with this opinion is very different from the same belief of a scholar who has spent twenty years studying the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. People often state things that they hear as their own opinion before even comprehending the full meanings. And establishing certain beliefs as infallible truths and prohibiting any opinion made against them will encourage such behavior, because in order to be right, people do not even need to think about what is right. Mill points out that “he who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that” (38). Being confronted with an opponent’s opinion is an indispensible part of the process of understanding a belief. As an example, consider an opinion about lying. Suppose that as a child, a man is told that he should never lie. For either the reason that it is stated by his parents – the supreme authorities who are never wrong about anything – or that he fears the possible punishment following a transgression of the statement, he abides by it and adopts it as his belief. Suppose the doctrine that people should never lie is established as infallible, and there’s no room for contradiction against it. He will then never need to think about the grounds for such a doctrine. But if he is exposed to the utilitarian view that under certain circumstances, when a lie can save a person’s life for example, lying is acceptable, can he still firmly insist in his belief? He cannot, until he comes up with an argument to rebut the view. He may draw on Kant’s theory and claim that lying is unacceptable because it cannot be universally applicable and results in contradiction in conceivability. When he does so, the belief that people should never lie has a completely different meaning for him. As Mill points out, it is when he tries to rebut a contradiction that he “possess[es] himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty” (38). Therefore, when supporters of a certain belief manage to eliminate all the contradicting opinions, by doing so they impair their own understanding of it.

One may claim that as long as everyone holds the truth, it does not seem to matter whether they understand it or not. Mill argues, however, “not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself” (40), and thus the opinion cannot effectively guide people’s actions. As has been argued above, the process of understanding an opinion is a process of being challenged by contradictions and rebutting them. People who are against an opinion have their reasons for being so: they know the difficulties of carrying out the opinion and the negative effects that follow. A man who is never exposed to these reasons is thus ignorant of the obstacles. When he encounters these obstacles in experience, he either insists on his belief and goes through the painful process of finding ways to overcome the obstacles, or in many cases, is overcome by the obstacles and though not allowed to deny the belief expressively, gives it up in practice. In modern China, it is printed in the middle school textbooks that “China is a democratic country”, but both in and beyond the school, a thorough discussion of this topic is officially prohibited. As the word “democracy” prevails in official or unofficial talks concerning politics, it is in effect equated with being “good” and “right” whenever spoken of. But can we say the country is democratic because of the universal “belief” in democracy? It is hard to give an affirmative answer if we consider the fact that many citizens do not even know when the election day comes. Without discussion, people are deprived of the essential means of understanding the meaning of democracy. How can they possibly carry out its principles in practice? To believe in a creed is to believe its validity in the context of its possible difficulties, otherwise it is easily abandoned in the face of reality. Opposing opinions, which point out the underlying problems of a creed, are thus desirable. By suppressing free thought, supporters of a belief harm themselves most severely in that they tend to “forget all of the belief except the formularies” (41), and the belief they try to protect loses its value in that it does not serve as a guide of people’s behavior.

Mill discusses one more kind of harm, less obvious but by no means insignificant – the harm done “to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy” (34-35). An unchallengeable belief established is like a dictated answer to a math problem, and not necessarily a true one. With it, the process of working out the problem is no longer a journey of free exploration, but a struggle of fitting into the existing answer. Most unfortunate are those who, given a wrong answer, work out the right one using their intelligence. The inconsistency between the natural outcome of their thinking and the sacred belief that must be true causes confusion and pain. To solve this problem, they either spend endless effort looking for a way to reconcile these incompatible two, or beaten by the great pain, deny the validity of their reasoning and refrain from the use of their mind. This is when, as Mill points out, “the entire moral courage of the human mind” (34) is sacrificed.

Suppressors of free thought do harm to themselves in more than one sense: they take higher risk of insisting on mistakes; they move away from their initial goal of promoting a certain belief; and they impair their mental well being, including both intellectual development and moral courage. Mill’s argument reveals that, a genuine belief is never generated in a state of pacification and non-conflict; it comes into being along a man’s way of encountering the difficulties of life and looking for solutions to them. Discussion is valuable, because it allows us to share our experiences and ideas with each other, making it possible for us to consider the difficulties without paying the prices encountering them in practice.

Works Cited

Mill, John Stuart. The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill. New York: Modern Library,

2002.

(This is a response posted in Buxis’ blog. Her blog is a nice place with original Chinese essays on movies, books, places, etc. Please follow this link if interested: http://wordsneverdie.ycool.com/)

Hi. Your blog seems really unattended, just like mine.

I completely agree with your saying that the job of a lawyer is not to defend justice but her client. Justice is for judges

to uphold.

Sooner or later, our discussions about law will be one between an expert and a layman. Please be ready to answer questions

from an ordinary citizen =)

I do have an interesting and distracting (hope not stupid as well) question about law that I hope you can address next time.

It deals with the whole system of law.

I’m not asking that you give some definite answer, but rather shed some light or at least write some thoughts on it. It helps

to think about it.

——–

I’ll word the question here (as concise as I can make it):

Will the cost of law be too high?

————-

Explanations:

For every software you install and every BBS you enter, you will always see a long passage of “terms of condition” that

specifies the legal status of the user and the provider. Did you ever read it? Well, almost no one does so. Why? Because is

it TOO COMPLEX.

Yes, every thing in modern society is governed by law, and law itself is getting more and more complicated. Physics has been

a very demanding subject for 300 years, yet a student with a college degree in physics can grasp most of the concepts of the

whole discipline. And what about law students? Well, after probably eight years of tedious study, you can be expert (if

fortunate) only in some very specific field. Really narrow. And in other fields you know little.

That’s the intimidating size of legal-knowledge – the terrifying, petrifying library of codes, precedents, cases and

different interpretations. It is better in some Roman-law country like China in which the law is somewhat uniform throughout

the country; in United States, crossing a state border means you have to learn a whole new set of rules. What is worse, the

common-law countries rely on precedents whose size is ever increasing with new trials.

In a nutshell, the legal documents are getting thicker every day, every moment, – even at this second when I write this short

essay. Usually we assume that more laws means a better society. But if it gets too much, it can be the opposite.

The very fact that you skip those “terms of conditions” proves that too much can be worse. If there are just a few lines, you

would probably read them. But when there is a long list, you simply give up.

Why give up? Don’t you realize that there is a risk in clicking the “I agree” button when you don’t know what you are

consenting to? The answer is very simple – when the law is too complicated, THE COST (to read it) IS HIGHER THAN THE RISK.

Therefore you would rather take the risk.

How sad.

That “terms of conditions” is supposed to clarify things for the parties involved in the internet activity. But does it?

—–

This is just a glimpse of the whole problem about law. The cost of legal service rises with the complexity of laws, and it is

rising every day. And clearly, the higher the cost, the more “uneconomical” it is for people to use law, and the less

effective is the rule of law.

Well you probably think we should simplify those verbose law books? Well, within the current system, you can do that only by

setting up new laws. You see the paradox?

This is not a specific problem, but rather a potential trouble related to the WHOLE SYSTEM.

It is already affecting our daily life. When you need to defend yourself in terms of law, you need legal consulting, which is

really expensive. That really pulls back you from doing what you should do. For example, a trader cheated you a big sum of

money. But when you calculate, in your dismay, you find out that hiring a lawyer may cost more than the money you can get

back, and that trader may lose all the money when you finally win in the court (it can take years), and that you are not so

sure of winning in the trial, you give up. You give up! What does that mean? It means that law is not functioning properly!

It is fails to protect one of its citizens!

It is exactly the high cost and low efficency of law that makes a lawful society less effective.

The aforementioned senario is a perfect example of what happens when the COST EXCEEDS THE BENEFIT.

In a specific case, cost can exceed benefit. So, isn’t it rational to say that, if the cost of law keeps rising (as it is

now), it may reach a point when the cost exceeds benefit FOR THE WHOLE SYSTEM?

————-

This is indeed a disturbing question to think about. I hope it is not valid, because it challenges the rule of law, which has

been accepted as a basic element of a civilized society.

As some philosophers speculated, we humans left the the “state of nature” governed by natural law to create societies

governed by man-made law. Just like natural laws run nature, man-made laws run society.

However, laws in nature is characterized by simplicity and elegance. Human laws is simple and elegant in spirit (like in

constitutions), but really complicated in specific things.

God created natural laws and designed them with unmatched talent. We, earthly beings, do not possess such talent.

—————–

I hope you can think about this question and address it next time you write, buxi. It is great that you have access to law

professors while I do not.

Again, I do not ask for a definite answer if there is not one; I simply want to know what you think.

Jiacui Li

Dr. Hélène Landemore

POLS0820D: Freedom

7 November 2008

Why is Mill’s defense of individuality so appealing? One reason is that he abstained from pure philosophical speculation and based his argument on utilitarian grounds. By “regard(ing) utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions” ^[1], he showed that individuality is not only desirable in theory, but also fruitful in practice. Compared with other abstruse theories on the same topic, Mill’s message communicates much more effectively to the masses: individualism is desirable, because it maximizes utility.

However, when approached from a completely utilitarian position, his theories are problematic. In this essay, I will first show that why Mill failed to meet truly utilitarian standards, and then introduce another way to evaluable the desirability of individualism.

For the society, free discussion – the interaction of individuality – “pushed to an extreme” ^[2] is far from desirable. Mill argued that the best decisions are made only “by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind”, including those with “peculiarity of taste” and “eccentricity of conduct”^[3]. However, in practice, resource is scarce and we have to spend them wisely. Due to the limit of time and energy, it is simply impossible to “listen to all that could be said” until “all that the devil could say against him is known and weighed”. Under many circumstances, we have to achieve “the unity of opinion” without “the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions”. For an individual, critical thinking is certainly good for strengthening his “human faculties of judgment”, but it is both inefficient and unnecessary to question every established custom as Mill suggested. For the purpose of utility, we cannot consider only the benefit of outright curiosity but also the cost entailed. Thinking consumes time and energy. In reality, the life of a person is so short, his mind-power so limited, yet the world so immensely complex that he has to take many established wisdom as granted. Even philosophers – they certainly have more intelligence and more spare time – can only take into mind a sample of things, let alone ordinary people? When water is scarce, it should be directed away from inefficient uses; when time is limited, energy should be kept away from unfruitful queries. This is not to say a person shouldn’t question, but he should question with selection, and rely on dependable wisdoms – those tested laws, time-honored traditions and well-working customs are less questionable even though not unquestionable. Luckily, much of the guidance bequeathed by our predecessors is much truer than “half-truths”, and we don’t have to be over-suspicious. A historical prospective tells us, if individuals are to go further than their predecessors, they cannot afford to go over every established knowledge again. If a society is to move forward, its each generation has to stand confidently on the shoulders of their forefathers. Otherwise no progress is possible.

If utility is the truly “utmost appeal”, then individual expression is desirable only to an extent. Luckily, some insight can be derived from other disciplines. Economics – arguably the most utilitarian field of study – advises us to think at the margin. For every human action, we should examine both its marginal utility and its marginal cost; the true utility brought by the action is the former minus the latter. Obviously, it is only when the marginal utility exceeds the marginal cost does the action increase the overall good. Mill stated that every individual contributes to the overall utility, because he only considered the marginal utility in absolute terms and failed to think comparatively. For social decision making, he evaluated only the benefit of listening to one more person but not the energy it takes to do so; for individual improvement, he weighed only the gains from questioning an established custom but not the expenses. When marginal cost is also taken into account, the whole story is different.

How many individuals should the society give voice to in decision-making, and how critical should a person be? Where should the line be drawn? To answer this question, it must be first understood that the marginal utility declines in the long run. If the initial marginal utility exceeds the marginal cost, the act increases overall utility until it reaches the point where two marginal values equal each other. Let’s call such point “the falling point of utility”. Clearly, individualism does not bring benefits when “pushed to the extreme”, because it will finally cost more than it produces. Individualism increases utility only when exercised up to the falling point of utility.

Such concepts can be too abstract for people unfamiliar with economics, and I following example to be helpful. I’ve been writing for The Critical Review, a Brown University student organization that publishes reviews of undergraduate courses, based on responses from students and instructors to questionnaires ^[4]. I, as a writer, am supposed to read those questionnaires and weave those opinions into 250-word reviews to help future students make informed course choices. At the beginning of the process, I am usually so ignorant that every one of the first few feedbacks I read is helpful. They give me basic knowledge about the course I’m to write about. As I proceed, the more feedbacks I read, the clearer the whole picture is to me, and the less does one more feedback contribute to the whole assessment. This is to say that the marginal utility of reading feedback is declining. However, the marginal cost – my time and energy – needed to read one more questionnaire is constant if not increasing. Therefore, there must be a point when the marginal benefit of reading another survey is no longer worth the time spent on it. This process of forming opinion about a course is a model that can correspond both to the social situation and the individual case.

The other feedbacks are discarded, and reasonably so. Am I “silencing” a student’s individual expression by not reading his survey? Well, though I’m not “silencing” him de jure by forbidding him to respond, I’m surely “silencing” him de facto by not letting his voice reach anyone. No one will know what he writes, nor will a word of his be included in the final review. Mill’s argument that “every individual opinion carries utility” still holds but is not strong enough for me to read anymore. Do I lose anything by taking what I’ve got out of the questionnaires I’ve read as granted? Hardly.

Mill believes in individuality fervently and over-values it. This slight distortion may be attributed to his strong but tortuous pursuit of liberty. After all, his argument for individuality is not an end in itself, but a means to justify the protection of liberty. In On Liberty, he defended liberty by praising the supreme importance of individuality. The underlying logic is that, since individuality is so desirable, the prerequisite for its realization – personal liberty – must be desirable as well.

Having said so much, I’m not denying the importance of individuality. Individual originality was, is and will be the liveliest source of inspiration for humanity. However, a truly utilitarian examination tells us that individualism “pushed to extreme” is not the right way. As soon as a thing reaches its extremity, it reverses its course.

——————

References

[1] [2] [3] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford University Press, USA, ISBN-13: 978-0199535736.

[4] http://www.thecriticalreview.org/cr_xml.php?action=faq.

Samson

Susan Blackmore’s chapter “The Ultimate Memeplex” and Lauren Slater’s essay, “Dr. Daedalus” both deal with the notion of the highs and lows of human evolution. Human beings are thought to be the only creatures capable of having a soul, free will, and an intelligence that supersedes that of other creatures. However, as evolution supposedly transformed us to the best and most adapted beings, humans still encounter greater problems, through memetics, than that of lower species. Memetics represents the passing of ideas, trends, behaviors, or usages throughout society.

Humans are both threatened by the power of technology and the actual evolution of our minds and bodies. In a sense, we have become powerless against our own creations and ourselves. Therefore, “We have […] come to accept that we are animals created by evolution. However, if memetics is valid, we will have to make another vast leap in accepting a similar evolutionary mechanism for the origin of our minds and ourselves” (Blackmore 8). Blackmore feels that humans accept a similar evolutionary mechanism with memes. Such a similarity is comparable as a dual mechanism shared between memes and humans. For such a relationship to occur, it is likely that memes are at least a human’s equal. Memes are further defined as “selfish replicators” capable of power: “We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators” (219). Blackmore’s quote reveals that although humans have power, these minute “things” called memes have power over us. Humans have had an evolutionary relationship with the selfish replicators since our creation; Blackmore raises the issue of a power struggle between the two, and makes one think that the memes may always have had power over humans.

Slater also deals with the issue of a power struggle; however, this struggle is a direct result from human ideas, as demonstrated through technology:

Although we usually assume technology is somehow deepening the rift between nature and culture, it also can do the opposite. In other words, technology can be, and often is, extremely primitive, not only because it allows people a sort of id-like, limbic-driven power but also because it can provide the means to toggle us down the evolutionary ladder, to alter our brains, struck in their rigid humanness, so that we are at last no longer landlocked. (Slater 18)

Technology is no longer a thing; it is personified as a creation capable of threatening our existence. Though humans have always been creating technologies to supposedly better human life, they may actually be hurting us. Since technology has been transforming into a greater power since day one, as memetics has, this raises the question as to if memes are expressed through our human technologies and are capable of destroying us in their interchangeable relationships.

One may wonder how we can be powerless against tiny little things called memes. Simply speaking, one may also think that consciousness is associated with free will and that one is in control of his or her life due to the choices one makes for his or herself; however, this is not always the case. As demonstrated though Slater, the notion of “proteanism” allows humans to shift shapes and alter their bodies. There is “nothing authentic” (Slater 15) about our protean abilities because the changes we make within ourselves do not represent our genuine humanness. Our newly god-like ability to morph defies our humanness; we may be escaping the realm of our humanness and there may be no turning back once we enter this stage. Such an act can result in us being everything or nothing. We think we have control over our bodies by making such choices, but Slater suggests otherwise: “Rosen is in our face making us face up to the fact that the inner and outer connections have crumbled. In our ability to be everything are we also nothing?” (Slater 15). The connections within ourselves have crumbled, for we are allowing our essential human connections to crumble at the hands of technology. As our powers are slowly falling down the evolutionary ladder, from humans to technology, they may also be falling to memes. Blackmore suggests this power represented by the memes: “Instead of thinking of our ideas as our own creations, and as working for us, we have to think of them as autonomous selfish memes, working only to get themselves copied. We humans, because of our powers of imitation, have become just the physical ‘hosts’ needed for the memes to get around. This is how the world looks from a ‘meme’s eye view’” (Blackmore 9). This quote also suggests that we are not in control of our lives, but memes are, through their replicator powers. Blackmore takes this idea a step further when she reveals: “Further experiments showed that with short stimuli (too short to induce conscious sensation) people could nevertheless guess correctly whether they were being stimulated or not. In other words they could make correct responses without awareness” (227). Consciousness is usually correlated with free will and the ability to make choices, but not in this case. The tiny memes have control over us as we are conscious. If their powers over a conscious human are that strong, just imagine their powers over the unconscious individual, when we are especially susceptible to ideas. Such susceptibility is demonstrated through subliminal messages and hypnosis for example.

Because memes could not exist without humans, we are, in a sense, responsible for the dangers we place upon ourselves, whether consciously or unconsciously. The technological risks we pose to ourselves in Slater’s essay are equally dangerous when compared with the powers of memes. These risks however are subjective; as illustrated in Slater, human advances are capable of easily killing us. Plastic surgery also poses the risks of the loss of humanness in our abilities to morph. Memes, because they have control over us, pose frightening ideas as well because we cannot control the memes. It is ultimately up to us to decide which is the scarier of the two: living a life that can destroy us through our own actions or living a life in which we have no controls of such destructions. Because memes and humans have a close relationship, memes may not only be controlling our lives but the destruction we pose to ourselves as well.

Memes represent a passing of ideas, similar to the idea of changing through Proteanism. As frightening as our future may appear in the face of memes and technology, a hope of sorts exists for humans because there is something “fundamental or core, to being human”. What defines us from other species is our possession of a soul. One of the many definitions of “soul” according to the Merriam Webster Dictionary is “our essential part”. Being that the words essential and fundamental have the same context in relation to the context of humans, our core in relation to being human is our soul. Evolutionary teachings, as well as atheistic beliefs prevalent among the science fields tend not to agree with the idea of the soul. “Postmodernism, by which I mean the idea of multiplicity, the celebration of the pastiche, and the rejection of logical positivism and absolutism as viable stances, will never die out, despite its waning popularity in academia. Its roots are too deep and ancient” (Slater 16). This quote reveals that proteanism and the rejection of religion has been a widely held belief since the beginnings of our evolutionary nature as humans. Therefore, proteanism has followed humans since we have developed belief systems. Yet, regardless of science’s constant strides in attempting to force people to believe in its theories, which may even disprove some religious roots, there will always be people who hold onto their religious beliefs and feel that man should act and look as Adam was when he was placed on Earth. This belief suggests that man was placed on Earth with a fundamental core, and although the core can be altered, the core still exists. The self that exists with a soul is referred to as the ‘real self’. This real self is a “persistent entity that lasts a lifetime, is separate from the brain and from the world around, and makes decisions. Everyday experience, ordinary speech and common sense are all in favor of the real self while logic and evidence are on the side of the illusory self” (Blackmore 228). Based upon Blackmore’s definitions of types of selves, a self with a soul could not be an illusory self. Because science cannot prove a soul through logic and evidence a self with a soul would have to be the ‘real self’. Additionally, the real self’s persistent entity represents the soul, because persistence is capable of existing for a longer time, or continuously. Therefore, when the body perishes, the soul, in a sense, would survive. The soul is also separate from the brain and the world, as no one can place a finger on exactly where our soul exists, but it is commonly believed that the soul is capable of living outside of the body after death. Since the body is capable of containing a soul, theoretically speaking, our soul cannot coexist only in the brain, because as the brain dies with the body the soul would as well.

In contrast with the ‘real self’s’ abilities of possessing a body outside of the brain, as well as a soul, the ‘illusory self’ defines all of our human qualities as neuronal, completely existing in the brain. Blackmore ultimately rejects the ‘real self’ and supports the ‘illusory self’ theory, claiming we are simply a bundle of neurons. Illusory self theories “liken the self to a bundle of thoughts, sensations, and experiences tied together by a common history, or a series of pearls on a string. Of these theories, the illusion of continuity and separateness is provided by a story the brain tells, or a fantasy it weaves” (Blackmore 228). Although much of the human experience exists within our thoughts, and sensations, life also exists outside of this. The ‘common history’ refers to our lifespan on Earth. Our sensations are a mental process due to immediate bodily stimulation often as distinguished from awareness of the process, as Blackmore demonstrates with the example of one experiencing a burning sensation. The brain tells us our hand is being burnt before we actually feel pain. If sensations are simply mental processes, however, Blackmore leaves out another important human trait: the ability to feel emotions. Unlike sensations, emotions are felt with the heart and not the brain. Perhaps our soul lies in our heart, capable of feeling things the brain cannot feel, be even so according to the ‘illusory self’ one is not capable of such a feeling. Emotions are not always felt due to immediate bodily stimulation, as song for example is capable of evoking emotion. Although the auditory waves come in contact with our ears, such a feeling is very different from a finger on a flame. The commonly used, and often trite phrase used by humans, “I love you with all my heart and soul” is said by people of every culture. Interestingly, this would not be said if the phrase did not suggest that humans are capable of achieving a different type of feeling with the heart as well as the soul. People do not say that they love someone with all their brain, even if every human ‘sensation’ is experienced here, for the sheer fact that we may be capable of feeling outside of the brain. This theory further suggests that everything we experience is due to the brain; we do not feel with the heart and soul, but our life is controlled with the brain.

As the theories of the ‘real’ and ‘illusory self’ are capable and incapable of having a soul, in Blackmore’s theories, Slater and the scientific Doctor Rosen both acknowledge the presence of a soul. The soul’s ambiguous location in Blackmore’s article is clearly defined in Slater’s article as existing in the brain: “Our brains are essentially indiscriminate, able to morph – like the sea god Proteus himself. Now I understand more deeply what Rosen meant when he said, “Plastic surgery changes the soul.” To the extent that we believe our souls are a part of our brains, Rosen is right” (Slater 18). Once again, the belief of where the soul lies, to those who believe in a soul, cannot be proven. Much like Blackmore suggests that the self exists somewhere in our body, behind our eyes, we cannot exactly place a location on our self as well. Although plastic surgery has the capabilities to change our soul, our fundamental core, the fact remains that Doctor Rosen acknowledges the soul. The dangers of proteanism are that once we alter ourselves beyond our core; there may be no turning back. If our soul is what defines our humanness, and plastic surgery can alter our fundamental core, then it also may lead us to question if we have a core. Such jumps in our evolutionary nature since creation may also destroy the existence of a soul, if proteanism is capable of giving humans god-like powers. Although our souls are “a part of our brains” their complete existence does not lie in the brain, as Rosen specifies the soul to be connected with part of the brain. Thence, the portion of the soul outside of the brain is untouchable, much like a spirit, and science is incapable of putting its hands on it, even though it may be able to touch or alter the part in our brain. As suggested through Blackmore, the brain controls experiences as well as soul. Depending on the souls’ location, however, science and even memes may not be capable of touching our essential humanness if it is capable of living outside the body. Hope exists.

Thank you, Qian, for allowing me to publish your essay. This is one more step towards our intellectual discussion, so I hope it can be made the norm in the future.

Your standpoint is very clear – defending that the idea of “general will” is not a threat to individuality, but rather, a blessing. According to Rousseau’s theory, “general will” is unanimous, infallible, wisest, and therefore the best thing that can happen to human society. After all, who doesn’t want to get all the benefits (positive freedom), and be “as free (negative freedom) as before”?

Well, Rousseau, like all other political philosophers, is a brilliant story teller. His description of “general will”, and the society directed by it, is really appealing. The problem is whether such an all-appealing thing exists?

The problem is, Just like all utopian-tellers, Rousseau is speculating – yes, speculating – about something that we do not know. In real life, such general will does not exist, nor does the “superman-state” of Fascism or the “all-distributor” of Communism. And here comes Isaiah Berlin’s argument: when such a thing doesn’t exist and you pretend that it does, you are probably using a false “general will” to oppress people.

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Since people created states, the relation of “general will” and “individual will” has always been an unsolved question. The state is a creation, and it does not think for itself; thus its creator, people, wants to enable it to think. Democracy proposes that the general opinion be generated from summing up individual ones. And a new question, a question that excited theorists for ages, arises: Is the conglomeration of ideas smarter than its constituent ideas, just like a beautiful piece of music created out of a sea of senseless notes or a poem created out of a bunch of boring letters? Or is it the contrary, that the democratic output be nothing more than a collection of personal interests? Or even worse, like in Isaiah Berlin’s view, that it be a potential justification for tyranny? Or, in Mill’s argument, that it be conducive to mob rule and stifling of originality?

Or, it is neither too great nor too lousy, and be somewhere between the extremes?

It is interesting to compare Berlin and Rousseau, who are both a bit paranoid in their extremist belief in positive and negative freedom. I can envision them arguing furiously if they happen to meet, especially when neither of them has an agreeable character.

———–

But things tend not to be like that, and compromises have to be achieved – in this sense, Mill’s argument seems very useful, that all proclamations of truth are just “half-truths”. It is a bit sad that most thinkers tend to be biased, even when they are thinking of things that are not arbitrary. Say capitalism. Adam Smith, being a strong defender of it, sees only its benefit of profit maximization; Marx, a strong critic, sees only it’s drawback of wealth polarization. They all passed away now, and history gave its answer: a balance is achieved by combining welfare equality and market efficiency. Looking back, it seems so amazing that such great minds can be so biased, but that’s the case. And it not only applies to those two people. It applies to all philosophers.

—————

I’ve digressed too much, and sorry for that. Coming back to your essay – if I’m given topic you wrote on, I would spend half of the time defending Berlin and the other half championing Rousseau. They are both brilliant in some sense, and blind in other areas. A balance between their arguments is the best answer for the question they are trying to address, and our project is trying to find the balance point.

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I’ve been babbling on without a thesis for more than six hundred words – they are all random thoughts, and it’s better to cease such activity. Qian, I do think your essay merit more than the grade you received. Helene is simply being critical. &

Qian Yin

Dr. Hélène Landemore

POLS0820D: Freedom

10 October 2008

In his work The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau aims to design a society within which an individual gets protection from the State, while “obey[ing] only himself and remain as free as before” (50). The freedom he depicts in his theory, however, is considered by Isaiah Berlin as a conception associated with tyranny, which may be commonly understood to relate to an absolute and centralized rule as well as the people’s lack of freedom. While the approach Rousseau takes to construct the society may raise readers’ apprehensions of the generation of a tyranny, taking a more comprehensive and coherent view of the book, I understand it as an integral part of a theory which effectively diminishes the possibility of a tyranny, and ensures the rule of the people.

In his essay Two Concepts of Liberty, Berlin examines the idea that there could be “something wider than the individual” (9), and thus people could be coerced in the name of it. He then points out that such logic is often used to justify a tyrannical rule. So the general will in Rousseau’s theory, through which people are free, becomes the target of Berlin’s blame, because it is described as “always upright” (Rousseau 59), and the Sovereign Power that it directs, which controls the right of legitimacy, is “absolute, sacred, and inviolable” (Rousseau 63). Measured with Berlin’s argument, the general will, in the name of the only path leading to people’s real freedom, at a position so supreme and absolute as to be able to force an individual to obey it, carries a dangerous affinity with tyranny.

The defense against such blame, however, presents itself in Rousseau’s book, in his explanation of how the general will generates and operates. Let’s begin with the nature of the general will. It is defined as the intersection of the particular wills of all (60). Rousseau does not say explicitly how the general will comes into being, but judging from a footnote he gives: “for a will to be general, it is not always necessary that it be unanimous, but it is necessary that all votes be counted; any formal exclusion destroys generality” (58), it is determined by the suffrage of every member of the society, under the rule that “the majority decides”. A general will generated through this process covers the common interest of the majority of the people. Determined by the vote of every individual, it is not a supreme being that stands independently and high above the members of the society, but rather, closely associated with the will of each. It is the result of every individual’s own decision-making, in which he takes full consideration of his own interest. This eliminates the possibility that people obeying the general will are coerced by “an ultimately correct way of life”, or “an absolute truth”, which is supposedly generated by a wise man’s brain, as Berlin apprehends. Nor can a ruler use general will as a “supreme end” to shape the people’s life or oppress the people, since it has been recognized by the majority of them. Thus the tyranny of a dictator is out of question.

But even if it’s secured that the Sovereign is directed by the common will of the majority of the people, what about the minority who are forced by this absolute power to obey a decision that they have voted against? It would sound self-contradictory to claim that they gain freedom by doing so. Berlin points out this problem, that “the sovereignty of the people could easily destroy that of individuals” (26). In other words, Rousseau’s design of the Sovereign might turn out to be the tyranny of the majority.

To defend Rousseau against such charge, I shall begin with the legitimacy of the general will, which comes with the generation of the social contract. A man is born with the freedom to do whatever his own need calls him to. But to maintain this freedom without the least constrain, he has to live solely on his own. Even the simplest cooperation with another would require a reconciliation that would flaw that perfect freedom. But at some point of history, when “the obstacles that interfere with their preservation in the state of nature prevail by their resistance over the forces which each individual can muster to maintain himself in that state” (Rousseau 49), when the costs of preservation of such freedom excesses the benefits of living completely independently, men form a society to live with each other in a better way. It is on the basis of this common interest that they enter the social contract. By doing so, a man essentially gives up the natural freedom in trade of a new kind of freedom, civil freedom, which consists of both being able to do what the society does not forbid him to do, and getting the protection he needs to live a peaceful, secured, and thus more enjoyable life.

Because a man’s original freedom is undeprivable, he must personally agree to enter the social contract, and thus all must be unanimous about forming the social contract. But once they have reached this point and agreed to live as a society, they are confronted with the reality that each of them has his particular interests that might differ from or even contradict with one another’s, that they might not be able to reach unanimity on any other decision about their life. To let the society function, they have to solve this inevitable problem, and that is why they apply the rule of “the majority decides”, which I think, should also be set up at the point of the formation of the social contract.

Let’s look at this from an individual’s point of view. When he has to obey a decision agreed by the majority of the people, which he has voted against, he is carrying out an obligation brought by the social contract. By obeying the rule that “the majority decides”, he is enabling the function of the society, and because it is the society that guarantees his civil freedom, in doing so he keeps himself free. This case can be explained in another way: to obtain the protection from the society, an individual has to pay a price, which includes complying with a decision of the majority. When he considers such deal worthwhile, he is acting according to his will even when he obeys others’ decision; when the costs excess the benefits for him, he could always withdraw himself from the social contract.

One thing is worth noticing: even though it can be justifiable to have individuals act against their particular interests, Rousseau makes an effort to diminish the degree of coercion of such cases, by suggesting a control of the proportional number of the votes needed to declare the general will. He introduces the maxim that “the more important and serious the deliberations are, the more nearly unanimous should be the opinion that prevails”.

Derived from the argument above is that, the property of the general will of always being upright lies in that it always aims at the common interest of the majority of the people, rather than that it always makes best or cleverest choices. This can be verified by Rousseau’s words: “a people is in any case always master to change its laws, even the best of them; for if it pleases to harm itself, who has the right to prevent it from doing so?” (80) And consequently another problem rises: A people could be “a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wills because it rarely knows what is good for it” (Rousseau 68), as Rousseau describes. Then what if the majority of the people make a bad decision, which is not to the maximum common interest of them? Berlin would consider such claim as the beginning of a dangerous track of thinking because it could lead to the statement that people are not the best decision maker and thus need someone capable and wise to decide for them. But Rousseau is not taking that track. He declares that “power can be transferred, but not will” (57), and designs other measures for this problem.

First, he emphasizes that “there [should] be no partial society in the State, and every Citizen state only his own opinion” (60). By ensuring this, a vote would genuinely reflect the interest of the voter; the result of a suffrage would indicate where the common interest lies. In addition, the people wouldn’t be influenced or blinded by any individual or party, to vote for an external purpose.

Another effective design is to have the lawgiver, who is “in every aspect an extraordinary man in the State” (69), draft the law, and then to have the people, who occupies the legislative right, to decide on it. The work of designing a system of legislation requires an outstanding level of intelligence, which one can’t expect the people as a whole to possess. Having a draft drawn by a wise lawgiver would provide the possibility of a more reasonable, comprehensive and practical system of law, which would benefit the society when it is legitimized by the people.

With all these considered, I deem Berlin’s interpretation of tyrannical implications in Rousseau’s theory rather unfair. We choose to unite to live a life of higher quality, but a unity inevitably generates an accumulation of power that could bring threats of other kinds. Rousseau makes an effort to improve the system, not by denying the power, but by finding ways to confine it to the hands of all those who live under it, and to direct them to utilize it fairly and wisely. That doesn’t sound like an ultimate solution, and new problems follow. But it is in this arduous process of balancing among various ends that we maximize the degree of our freedom.

Works Cited

Berlin, Isaiah. “Two Concepts of Liberty.” Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1969. 9 Oct. 2008

<http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/twoconcepts.pdf>

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract and other later political writings.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

It is often alleged that hypothetical social contract theories are waste of paper because they are hypothetical. That remark seems logical. After all, what’s the practical value of those vague theories relying heavily on suspicious assumptions, analogies and metaphors?

But if they are useless, why would they be banned by contemporary crown-heads? Why should those powerful men feel threatened by “wasted paper”? I would argue the opposite: despite their theoretical nature, social contract theories are very useful.

Actually, all hypothetical contract theories can be useful. They sure look innocent when resting on book shelves, but once they are released into minds, they can be seriously destructive. By providing justification – merely justification and nothing else – those contract theories changed the history. They challenged suppressive ideology, shook the legitimacy of thrones, unleashed power of the people and led to revolutions for freedom.

Social theories can dictate the “right order” for societies. Before enlightenment, people had been bound by kings’ favorite theory of contract – the divine right of kings. This concept is essentially another form of social contract, in which the Party A (god) authorizes Party B (the king) to rule the subject (people) and to take them as property. This contract is very convenient for the king, because it allowed him to bypass the angry people and go straightly to god; when he comes back from the heaven, he already had god’s appointment certificate in his hands. You may see how clever it is to invoke god – the most unquestionable source of authority. Looking in retrospect, we can hardly find any proof for the hypothetical concept of divine rights, but we have to agree that it was useful and handy for rulers. By virtue of repetition and brainwashing propagation, monarchs planted their fictional theory deeply into people’s minds, made them voluntary slaves, outlawed dissents, justified his own rule, and sustained hereditary monarchy for hundreds of years.

An even more successful contract theory was devised in China – I call it more successful because of its longevity of three thousand years. It was almost the same “divine approval” theory with another name. Created in Zhou Dynasty in 1122 BC ^[1], it was called “the mandate of heaven”, and its main difference from its European counterpart was created by usurpers who sought justification for their action. The theory stated that heaven would bless the authority of a just ruler, but would be displeased with a despotic ruler and would withdraw its mandate. A successful revolt could be interpreted as evidence that the Mandate of Heaven had passed, and it would transfer to those who would rule better. ^[2] This “bill of usurper rights” was first used by the Zhou Dynasty to justify their overthrow of the Shang Dynasty. And unsurprisingly, it was later used by many succeeding dynasties to come.

Other such theories throughout the world reigned as well. They were the predecessors of the enlightenment social contract theories, and were exactly what the later theories challenged and defeated. But they did rule the world for quite a long time. Their explanations of social order were inadequate, their expressions vague, their logics awkward; they relied solely on mysterious speculations. But they conquered minds and made people obedient for ages. Are those theories hypothetical? Yes. Are they hypocritical? Probably. Are they useful? Certainly.

Many attempts against despots have been made, but most of them were unsatisfactory. We can imagine the bad time those early revolutionists had. Let’s consider what barrier our revolutionist had to overcome before actually doing something: firstly, he must explain to himself why he could revolt without a sense of guilt when that is considered totally illegitimate; secondly how could he persuade followers to revolt without feeling guilty; thirdly he had to declare to the public of all the unjustified ideas that monarchs are not holy, obedience is not duty, and rebellions are not evil. In a word, he needed justification. He was not only fighting against a monarch, but also a set of firmly held beliefs of the society. Those fictional doctrines used by monarch prolonged monarchy by dictating what people think, and the longevity of monarchy perpetuates those doctrines, making social change even more difficult. Thus there were so many rebellions against monarchs but seldom against the monarchial system, and subversion of a despot usually ends up with another. And let’s not blame our revolutionist: how could he make real improvement before knowing what a free state would look like?

Are people free from their birth? How can they overthrow their ruler, and what could they do after the overthrown? All these questions needed answers, and actions needed justification. The new contract theories provided the answers and justifications. The parties involved in this new contract are only the government and the people, and it decrees that the right of the former derives solely from the consent of the latter. When people come together they form a “sovereign”, and it produces a “general will” as their collective will; the agreement of the contract is still binding, though theoretically dissents may leave. God is invoked less often, but just like those they are situated against, the new contracts still appeal to something higher – nature. The attempt to relate humans to nature climaxed with a speculation of “state of nature” and the argument that the “natural” formation of society is driven by “mutual consent”. Thus is the new contract theory. It sounds much more plausible and attractive to people. Straightforwardly, they striped kings of divine power and tied them to the will of people.

The new contract proved a really powerful weapon. Though monarchs banned the books, exiled the authors, they couldn’t stop the spread of ideas. And ideas can be dangerous. When the liberating thoughts proliferated all over countries, the demise of old social order is just a matter of time.

Liberation comes from within. One cannot be free until he wills to be so, and once his got that will he cannot be stopped. Rousseau put it much better: “liberty is not to be found in any form of government; she is in the heart of the free man; he bears her with him everywhere.” ^[3]

Some people argue that social contract couldn’t be legally binding because no one really signed it. But actually, contracts are binding only because we made them so. Again, social contracts do more than analyze social norms – they create norms. Now that social contracts have taken control of minds, let’s examine the results. Still remember our revolutionist who was frustrated by lack of justification for his rebellion? If he still lives today, citing a hypothetical social contract, he can conclude that he is born to be free. Government heads may well disagree – the point is that if they do, they will have to say why – and if they want to deny him any rights, again they will have to justify that denial. One may well find those theoretical contracts to be nonsense, but he has to prove it to others first – and now the onus is on him the dissenter. See the reversed pattern?

Long before state exists, tribe leaders knew denouncing the wrongdoings of enemies could increase morale. Judges could refer to legal antecedents to justify their decision. Rhetoricians could use metaphors, clericals could invoke scriptures, essayists could quote ancient sentences, and even in the case of a president facing scandal, he still could invoke the Bible to evade questions. Justification gives people strength, while illegitimacy deprives power. For centuries, people were enslaved by theories that worked for dictators. By providing the justification of freedom, the hypothetical social contract theories unleashed the latent power of people, ended frustrations and ignited the remarkable pursuit of freedom.

References

[1] “Mandate of heaven” – Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_of_heaven

[2] “Mandate of heaven” – Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_of_heaven

[3] Jean- Jacques Rousseau, Emile, Book V [1719]

(This is an essay written like a letter to Helene, instructor of POLS 0820. )

I didn’t notice the importance of the concept of freedom until two years ago. It came to me through Bush’s second inaugural speech, “There Is No Justice without Freedom” Before he spoke, I assumed that he would elaborate on combating terrorism, but he turned the speech into a praise song of the idealism of liberty. And his justification for Iraq was done by invoking the cause of freedom:

We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.

Applause. Now I know that, after listening to a hundred or so American speeches, this is exactly what the audience is waiting for. Freedom explains a lot. For so many times does some American politician painstakingly build up the momentum and the voice level of his speech, by piling stories and analogies, only to lead to the resounding outburst of this final word – freedom! When this long awaited word pops out of his mouth, the audience cheers vigorously, just like the fans cheers their long awaited movie star. This word speaks deep into their heart.

But to a typical Chinese boy who was new to this western notion of freedom, the whole thing seemed so illogical. In Bush’s speech, freedom became omnipotent. For example:

There is only one force of history that can [1] break the reign of hatred and resentment, and [2] expose the pretensions of tyrants, and [3] reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom.

I was confused: why on earth can an abstract concept accomplish so many daunting tasks?

This speech focused on liberty. Let’s see a few more quotes:

“…freedom, … is eternally right.”

“Eventually, the call of freedom comes to every mind and every soul.”

“freedom is the permanent hope of mankind, the hunger in dark places, the longing of the soul”

And don’t these quotes remind us of sermons, which always appeal to some higher authority of spirit which is all-powerful? Later, after being omnipotent and utmost desirable, freedom became a force that spreads and conquers:

“We go forward with complete confidence in the eventual triumph of freedom.”

“……one day this untamed fire of freedom will reach the darkest corners of our world.”

……

I should stop here, or this essay will turn into a quoting count of some speech (it already is, I’m afraid). In this two thousand word speech, the very word “freedom” occurred twenty-seven times; “liberty” occurred fifteen times. That’s another reason I relate this speech with religious texts – science persuade by reasoning; religion convince by repeating.

His speech concluded, leaving me puzzled. Through his words, I gradually came to see the weight they assign to the idea of liberty. It seems that freedom, to Americans, is the only and ultimate goal of humanity. And government is instituted solely to defend freedom. And the fact that people applause and agree to all Bush’s assumptions and statements about freedom, reveals something to me about western minds. Why don’t they question? Well, because they believe in it too.

Interesting.

Okay. This was the thing that triggered my curiosity on this subject. After that encounter, I listened to political speeches and read political statements, with a wary eye for references to freedom. I read a bit on Rousseau and his contemporary thinkers who initiated the sweeping cause for liberty. I studied the American system. I made more liberal friends and discussed with them. Since freedom worth the whole western world’s zeal, it must worth my time, as well.

The concept is so important. The western belief of personal liberty can help explain the interpretation of democracy, the argument for smaller government, the prioritization of equity over efficiency, the preference of common law over Roman law, the commitment for lassie-faire economy, the fear of communism. Therefore I consider it as a good starting point to more understanding.

It underlies the whole western world ideology, including philosophy, politics, legislature, and even economics. It is a prevailing reason and explains people’s actions and inner most desires. It’s something deeply rooted in every western heart. Bush knows that well when he conducted his speech to please his people. If he is president in China, he won’t invoke freedom to justify himself and hide the real concerns. It does not work so well there.

Our world is undergoing an ideology globalization, and many western notions are becoming universal. Therefore understanding freedom is also a way to understand the world.

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So it’s worth the effort to study.

When reading philosopher’s works, I often see tendencies to exaggerate the importance of things they feel strongly of – human minds are inevitable restricted by their immediate experience. For the same reason, I may be mistaken in taking the freedom thing so seriously. Or am I?

In order to faciliate discussion and exploration,

more specificly,

exploration on the topic of freedom,

and even more specificly,

on the things related to freedom presented by a course named POLS 0820A in some strange school with a color as its name,

Some eager animals convene here,

Looking around at the beautiful yet mysterious world,

Sniffing,

Searching,

Scratching their heads,

Busy contemplateing.

They wonder loudly,

What is beyond the mountains,

What beneath the rivers.

They marvel at every colorful shell brought to them by the summer waves,

and every leaf that falls with a wintry breaze;

They love,

every star that twinkles,

Every drop of water,

And every beam of sun shine.

They pray,

That their journey is worthwhile;

They imagine,

That they are right in direction;

They hope,

And sometimes, they even believe,

That one day,

They may really understand everything out there.

In order to see the world with brighter eyes,

In order to appreciate the beauty of mind,

Fate brought them here together by the same intense cuiosity.

Please help them ,God.